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Explaining Government Preferences
for Institutional Change in EU
Foreign and Security Policy
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi
Abstract Some member-states of the European Union ~EU! want a suprana-
tional foreign and security policy, while other member-states oppose any significant
limitation of national sovereignty in this domain+ What explains this variation? An-
swering this question could help us to better understand not only the trajectory of
European unification, but also the conditions and prospects of consensual political
integration in other regional contexts and territorial scales+ The main research tradi-
tions in international relations theory suggest different explanations+ I examine the
roles of relative power capabilities, foreign policy interests, Europeanized identities,
and domestic multilevel governance in determining the preferences of the fifteen EU
member governments concerning the institutional depth of their foreign and security
policy cooperation+ I find that power capabilities and collective identities have a sig-
nificant influence, but the effect of ideas about the nature and locus of sovereignty,
as reflected in the domestic constitution of each country, is particularly remarkable+
What can induce the governments of independent states to relinquish one of their
most cherished possessions, that is, the right and the ability to act on the inter-
national stage according to their own judgment and preferences? This question is
particularly pressing in a time when international interdependence is widely per-
ceived as expanding and intensifying+ As long as states remain central actors in
world affairs, the possibility of solving common problems and seizing mutually
beneficial opportunities depends crucially on their willingness to cooperate and—in
the view of many—to go beyond cooperation toward deeper forms of suprana-
tional political integration+
Blueprints for the creation of global political structures face the problem that,
as things stand, transcending the present state-centric world would require the con-
sent of the leaders of the states themselves+ Certainly this is one of the reasons
A previous version of this article was presented at the 4th ECPR Pan-European International Rela-
tions Conference, Canterbury, 8–10 September 2001+ For their valuable comments, I would like to
thank Filippo Andreatta, Daniele Archibugi, Simone Borra, Nicola Dunbar, Fabio Franchino, Alkuin
Kölliker, Leonardo Morlino, Angelo Panebianco, Eiko Thielemann, Ben Tonra, the editors of IO, and
three anonymous reviewers+ I am responsible for any mistakes+
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why the consensual merging of states has been such a rare phenomenon+ How-
ever, even the greatest pessimists cannot deny that in history, there have been in-
stances of unification among states that resulted from a voluntary agreement among
their leaders: the United States is a prominent example+ This fact brings one back
to the question mentioned at the beginning: why should governments of sovereign
states wish to limit their freedom of action to the point of merging with other
states within larger governmental structures?
This article aims to offer a contribution to this sweeping question by examin-
ing the preferences of specific governments on a specific issue in a specific histor-
ical moment+ The governments are those of European Union ~EU! member-states,
the issue is the creation of a supranational foreign and security policy, and the
moment is the 1990s+ Of course, given the vast differences between the EU and
other settings, it is not part of my argument that the results of the following in-
quiry can be easily generalized to other regional contexts or even to questions of
global political integration+ However, it seems plausible to think that a realistic
analysis of international polity formation requires, as a preliminary step, a certain
number of empirical investigations of analogous processes at the macroregional
level+
In this article I assess various factors that might plausibly explain a govern-
ment’s willingness to pool and delegate sovereignty+ Because the importance of
each factor examined here is emphasized by a different school of international
relations theory, this article can also be seen as a contribution to the assessment of
the empirical accuracy of various contending or complementary perspectives within
the discipline+
The first section of this article specifies the terms and the relevance of the re-
search question+ The second section presents a number of potential explanations
of the willingness of governments to pool and delegate sovereignty in foreign and
security policy, and relates those explanations to specific research programs in in-
ternational relations theory+ I focus in particular on the distinction between instru-
mentalist and culturalist approaches to institutions+ The third section presents the
explanatory strategies used in this article: logistic regression analysis and a novel
qualitative comparative method based on fuzzy-set logic, developed by Charles
Ragin+ The fourth section discusses the operationalization of the explanatory fac-
tors chosen for consideration and presents the data sources used in the analyses+
The fifth and sixth sections present the results of the two analyses, and the sev-
enth section interprets them+ The conclusion summarizes the findings and their
implications for current debates in international relations theory+
European Foreign Policy as a Contested Institution
The differences between European integration in the economic domain on the one
hand and integration in security affairs on the other are often emphasized by pol-
icymakers and scholars alike+ Market-building policies and some market-correcting
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policies are governed according to what has become known as the “Community
method,” that is, a complex set of institutional rules and practices that ensure a
prominent role for supranational agencies and a high level of legalization+ In for-
eign and security policy, on the contrary, supranational institutions have little or
no power, and the obligations laid upon governments are vague or frequently ig-
nored+1 This seems to confirm the skepticism about functional spillovers that Stan-
ley Hoffmann voiced almost forty years ago: “When the functions are concerned
with the ineffable and intangible issues of Grosspolitik, when grandeur and pres-
tige, rank and security, domination and dependence are at stake, we are fully within
the realm of traditional interstate politics+”2
To many international relations scholars, the relatively feeble state of foreign
policy integration is far from surprising+ Foreign and security policies are pivotal
to state sovereignty, and for these authors, sovereignty—understood as the sur-
vival of the state as a distinct political entity in world affairs—is a “good” that
states value over all others+ According to John J+ Mearsheimer, “the most basic
motive driving states is survival+ States want to maintain their sovereignty+”3 If
states are assumed to be “unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own pres-
ervation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination,”4 then the absence of
consensual political and military integration in Western Europe is easily under-
standable+ Even if one allows political integration in exceptional circumstances,
such as massive external threats or unique opportunities for territorial expansion,5
it can be argued that in Western Europe the benefits of an integrated foreign and
military policy never outweighed the costs in terms of sovereignty+
While this perspective has some empirical merit, it neglects a crucial aspect of
the Western European experience: there was, and still is, considerable variation in
the preferences of governments concerning foreign policy integration+ The opti-
mal level of political unification in the EU is a matter of intense controversy not
only among its citizens, but also among its member governments+ In the light of
these controversies, any interpretation of foreign and security policy integration
that assumes a uniform concern for sovereignty and ignores differences between
government preferences is bound to remain inadequate+
The institutional trajectory of European integration is decided mainly during
Intergovernmental Conferences ~IGCs!, which since the 1980s have taken place
approximately every five years+ These conferences produce “grand bargains,” whose
terms are generally written into the basic treaties of the EU+ European govern-
ments have expressed divergent positions on the form and depth of foreign and
1+ Until 1993 the institutional arrangements for foreign policy coordination among EU member-
states were known as European Political Cooperation ~EPC!+ Since the Maastricht Treaty, they have
been called Common Foreign and Security Policy ~CFSP!+
2+ Hoffmann 1965, 88+
3+ Mearsheimer 1994095, 10+
4+ Waltz 1979, 118+
5+ Riker 1975 and 1996+
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security policy integration, and as a consequence long and difficult negotiations
have ensued+ For instance, during the IGC of 1996–97, which led to the Amster-
dam Treaty, EU foreign ministers or their personal representatives met on more
than twenty different occasions to discuss possible revisions of the Maastricht Treaty
provisions pertaining to the Common Foreign and Security Policy ~CFSP! and the
defense policy of the Union+ In this time, dozens of position papers, nonpapers,
and draft treaty articles on the CFSP were presented and discussed by ministers
and officials+6 Moreover, the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations were relatively sim-
ple compared to those that generated the foreign and security provisions of the
Maastricht Treaty in the 1990–91 IGC, which occurred in the uncertain inter-
national context that followed the end of the Cold War+7 Those fierce negotiations
on European treaty reform reflect the existence of significant disagreements among
governments about the depth of integration in foreign and security policy, and
make clear that the CFSP is a “contested institution+”8
Table 1 offers a synoptic presentation of these disagreements, with reference to
the main treaty revisions on CFSP that were considered in the IGC of 1996–97+
For each revision, the table indicates the position expressed by each member-state
during the prenegotiation phase+ If implemented, these treaty revisions would have
meant a higher level of sovereignty pooling or sovereignty delegation in the insti-
tutional structure of the EU+9 Sovereignty pooling occurs when states agree to take
collectively binding decisions without the possibility of national veto+ In the con-
text of the 1996–97 IGC, to pool sovereignty meant to allow qualified majority
voting ~QMV! in the Council of Ministers for all decisions pertaining to CFSP, or
at least for all decisions of implementation+ Sovereignty delegation occurs when
6+ McDonagh 1998+
7+ On the Maastricht negotiations, see Forster 1999; Laursen and Vanhoonacker 1992; and Moravc-
sik 1998+
8+ Gourevitch 1999, 137+
9+ On the distinction between sovereignty pooling and sovereignty delegation, see Moravcsik 1998,
67+ In this article I ignore the negotiations on whether to add defense policy to the competencies of the
EU+ That is, I am interested in changes of the “institutional capacity” and not of the “functional scope”
of the EU, to use Lindberg and Scheingold’s 1970 terminology+ During the 1990s, most of the coun-
tries that demanded a supranational CFSP also wanted the inclusion of defense among the competen-
cies of the EU, and vice versa+ However, the sets of countries supporting the two reforms ~increasing
the depth of integration and extending it to defense issues! do not coincide perfectly+ This is mainly
because of France’s position, which was and is strongly supportive of a European defense identity but
is opposed to supranational decision making for defense as well as for the CFSP+ As remarked by a
French member of the European Parliament, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, France wants a strong Europe, as
do the Germans, but with weak institutions, as do the British ~quoted in Agence Europe 6507, 23 June
1995!+ Since 1998, the British government has no longer opposed a defense role for the EU, but—as
with France—the United Kingdom has retained its hostility toward supranational procedures, as op-
posed to intergovernmental decision making+ The resulting convergence of the preferences of France
and Britain has made possible the recent progress in creating a European Security and Defence Policy
on an intergovernmental basis+ Furthermore, during the 1990–91 IGC, the Netherlands had the oppo-
site combination of preferences as France: it supported a federal foreign policy but opposed the devel-
opment of a European defense+ In sum, national positions on the two dimensions do not coincide
perfectly, and this article examines only the issue of the institutional depth of CFSP+
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TABLE 1. Support for supranational integration in foreign and security policy, 1996
A B D DK E F FIN GR I IRL L NL P S UK
Allow QMV in Council for decisions of principle Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No
Allow QMV for decisions of implementation Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes N+A+ Yes N+A+ Yes Yes Yes N+A+ No
Unify the institutional structure of the EU Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No
Increase the powers of the European Commission Yes Yes N+A+ No N+A+ No No Yes N+A+ N+A+ Yes Yes Yes N+A+ No
Increase the powers of the European Parliament N+A+ Yes Yes N+A+ N+A+ No No Yes Yes N+A+ N+A+ Yes N+A+ N+A+ No
Finance CFSP through the Community budget Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N+A+ Yes Yes N+A+ Yes Yes N+A+ N+A+ No
Sources: See Appendix+
Note: A 5 Austria+ B 5 Belgium+ D 5 Germany+ DK 5 Denmark+ E 5 Spain+ F 5 France+ FIN 5 Finland+ GR 5 Greece+ I 5 Italy+ IRL 5 Ireland+ L 5 Luxemburg+ NL 5 Netherlands+
P 5 Portugal+ S 5 Sweden+ UK 5 United Kingdom+ QMV 5 qualified majority voting+ CFSP 5 Common Foreign and Security Policy+ Yes 5 reform supported+ No 5 reform opposed+
N+A+ 5 no position or missing data+
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states transfer some decisional power to supranational bodies+ Specifically, in the
mid-1990s to delegate sovereignty meant to increase the role and powers of the
European Commission and the European Parliament in CFSP, to mitigate the in-
tergovernmental nature of CFSP by unifying the “three-pillared” institutional struc-
ture of the EU, and to finance CFSP operations from the Community budget instead
of ad hoc contributions by the member-states+
The diversity of government positions challenges the view that the preservation
of sovereignty is a basic goal shared by all states+ It also calls for an explanation:
why are some European governments more willing to pool and delegate sover-
eignty than others? The next section reviews various possible answers to this puzzle+
Possible Explanatory Factors: Interests, Capabilities,
Identities, and Constitutional Cultures
There are several research programs in international relations theory, and each of
them stresses one particular set of factors as especially useful for explaining for-
eign and security policies in general and supranational integration in particular+
While it is often assumed that foreign policy decisions require multicausal expla-
nations, there is little clarity about when the predictions of different theoretical
approaches should be seen as complementary and when they are competing+ In
this article I consider a number of explanatory factors that have been highlighted
by different theoretical traditions, without trying to determine ex ante how their
effects might be combined in each particular case+
Broadly speaking, international institution-building can be interpreted from two
perspectives+ The first assumes that governments have a purely instrumental atti-
tude toward international institutions+According to this instrumentalist approach,10
institutions in general and specific aspects of institutional design are not valued
per se, but only as means to attain exogenously defined goals+ Institutions not only
set constraints to strategic action, but they are themselves the object and outcome
of strategic action+ From the second perspective, the preferences of governments
for certain institutions are not based primarily on their anticipated capacity to pro-
duce well-defined outcomes, but on their coherence with entrenched beliefs and
normative commitments+ In a sense, each of the two approaches stresses a distinct
logic of action: a logic of expected consequences or a logic of appropriateness+11
In this section I derive from these perspectives several more specific hypotheses
concerning the CFSP+
In the instrumentalist perspective, the fact that governments prefer different in-
stitutional arrangements can be explained in reference to their varying interests or
their varying resources+ This consideration forms the basis for selecting the first
10+ Gourevitch 1999, 142+
11+ March and Olsen 1998+
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two causal factors that will be considered in the examination of institution-building
in CFSP+
The first causal factor to be considered is the congruence between the antici-
pated outcomes of a supranational foreign policy on the one hand, and each gov-
ernment’s interests in world affairs on the other+ The importance of this factor is
stressed by rational institutionalism,12 which distinguishes preferences regarding
substantive policy issues ~or policy preferences! from preferences regarding insti-
tutional forms ~or constitutional preferences! and explains the latter in terms of
the former+ Governments support or oppose the introduction of certain institu-
tional and procedural rules depending on whether they believe that these rules
will produce outcomes corresponding to their exogenously determined interests or
not+13
In the context of CFSP, EU governments have preferences regarding a number
of issues of world politics and can be expected to support those institutional forms
that make their preferred outcome more likely to happen+ According to rational
institutionalism, the main determinant of a government’s opposition to supra-
national institutions in CFSP should be its concern that, once they are intro-
duced, the EU would make decisions that frequently run against the preferences
of that government on particular international issues+ Specifically, with regard to
sovereignty pooling, the concern is that the government might often be outvoted
in the Council of Ministers+ With regard to sovereignty delegation, a government
might be concerned that on specific policy questions, the supranational agencies
would be more responsive to the preferences of a majority of member-states while
the government itself is in a minority position+
Supranational integration implies the abolition of the national veto, and this might
be especially difficult to accept for governments whose preferences can be ex-
pected to often be at odds with the view of the majority—that is, for preference
outliers+ Rational institutionalism expects that ~1! the more a government fears to
be outvoted, the less likely it is to accept supranational integration, and ~2! the
fear to be outvoted depends mainly on the extent to which its policy preferences
conform to, or depart from, the expected policy preferences of a majority of gov-
ernments+ In this analysis, this aspect is called “policy conformity+”
When choosing institutional rules, of course, governments cannot know for cer-
tain what their policy preferences and those of the other governments will be once
the rules are operative+ However, it would be implausible to think that govern-
ments choose rules behind a “veil of ignorance”: because issues in world politics
display a certain degree of continuity, the governments’ knowledge about past and
12+ See Keohane 1984; Martin 1992; Moravcsik 1998, 67–77; and Bräuninger and König 2000+
13+ See Garrett and Tsebelis 1996; Gourevitch 1999; and Bräuninger et al+ 2001, 49+ Strictly speak-
ing, constitutional preferences depend on interests as well as beliefs about how institutions will affect
outcomes—“theories,” in the terminology of Vanberg and Buchanan 1989+ This second aspect does
not receive separate consideration in this article, because it can plausibly be assumed that govern-
ments do not have different beliefs about the operation of existing or possible EU institutions+
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current preferences is sufficient to form reasonable expectations about future pol-
icy preferences+ Hence the first hypothesis to be tested is the following:
H1: Governments that expect to be outliers with respect to policy preferences will
be less supportive of supranational integration in the foreign and security field
than governments with a high level of expected policy conformity+
The second causal factor to be considered in this article is also connected to a
consequentialist approach to international politics, but this approach stresses dif-
ferences in resources rather than differences in interests+14 Realist scholars in in-
ternational relations are less interested in the specific content and variation of policy
preferences than in the means states have to obtain what they want+ While realism
comes in many variants, all of them hold that the distribution of power capabili-
ties among states is a crucial determinant of their behavior+15 A corollary is that
differences in the behavior of states can be explained mainly by looking at their
relative position in the state system+
Some realist authors, as I have pointed out in the previous section, make as-
sumptions about state goals that are incompatible with the demonstrated willing-
ness of various European governments to deepen their foreign and security policy
integration+ Other variants of realism, however, do not rule out the possibility of
voluntary integration, but seek to explain it by referring to the distribution of power
among states+ In particular, Joseph Grieco has suggested a “neorealist” interpreta-
tion of the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union, according to which the institu-
tional arrangement agreed upon at Maastricht reflects the interest of France and
Italy in gaining “voice opportunities” vis-à-vis Germany for determining mon-
etary policy in Europe+ Grieco’s thesis is that, “especially for weaker but still sa-
lient states, institutionalization might constitute an effective second-best solution
to the problem of working with, but not being dominated by, a stronger partner in
the context of mutually beneficial joint action ~the first-best solution would be to
become more powerful and thus be on more equal terms with the stronger partner,
or perhaps even not to require cooperation!+”16
Realist theory leads to the expectation that the international distribution of power
affects each government’s interest in a common foreign and security policy in a
different way+ More specifically, governments whose power resources allow them
to conduct an independent and effective foreign policy should see no need to re-
linquish their autonomy and have their hands tied by supranational institutions+
Weaker countries, on the contrary, should be interested in an integrated foreign
14+ Hasenclever et al+ 1997+
15+ See Waltz 1979; and Legro and Moravcsik 1998+
16+ Grieco 1996, 289+ A similar argument with regard to European defense cooperation is presented
by Art 1996+
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and security policy for at least two reasons+ First, these countries can expect their
influence on world affairs to increase when the EU acts as a unit+ The autonomy
they would lose would be offset by the collective power of the supranational pol-
ity of which they are a part+ Second, a tight institutional structure would be a way
to constrain the stronger member-states, whose independent foreign policy might
become a threat to the interests of the smaller countries in the future+ By this logic,
supranational integration enhances the security of smaller states by augmenting
their external influence and by constraining potential sources of tension+
The hypothesis deriving from realism’s emphasis on relative power resources is
thus the following:
H2: Governments with higher power capabilities will be less supportive of supra-
national integration in foreign and security matters than governments with lower
capabilities+
Both explanatory factors considered so far—policy preferences and relative
capabilities—suppose an instrumental and calculating attitude toward European
institution-building in foreign and security matters+ The other two factors consid-
ered in this article reflect a logic of appropriateness rather than of consequences+
In international relations theory, this logic is generally emphasized by constructiv-
ism, which regards identities, culture, and norms as independent determinants of
the behavior of actors in the international system+ Some constructivists emphasize
the processes of identity formation and transformation that derive from inter-
actions among states,17 while others point to how the identities, values, and cul-
tural attitudes of domestic social groups affect the behavior of their governments+18
The constructivist hypotheses considered in the rest of this article belong to the
latter version of constructivism, which examines the domestic determinants of in-
ternational behavior and thus takes a “bottom-up” perspective+
Whether constructivists stress the systemic or the domestic sources of state iden-
tity formation, they all hold that “variation in state identity, or changes in state
identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states+”19 Furthermore,
“changes in the collective identity of societal actors transform the interests of rel-
evant collective actors that constitute the @international# system+”20 Constructiv-
ists have described the changes in collective identities and values that occurred in
Europe since the Middle Ages, and have argued that these developments substan-
17+ Alexander Wendt is one such systemic constructivist, who nonetheless acknowledges that “cer-
tainly a complete theory of state identity would have a substantial domestic component+” Wendt 1999,
28+
18+ This approach has been called liberal constructivism—see Risse-Kappen 1996—or ideational
liberalism—see Moravcsik 1997+
19+ Jepperson et al+ 1996, 52+
20+ Hall 1999, 5 ~italics omitted!+
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tially altered the way governments related to their external environment+21 For in-
stance, Rodney Bruce Hall has argued that the nineteenth-century transition from
a legitimating principle based on territorial sovereignty to the principles of na-
tional sovereignty and self-determination transformed the interests and practices
of states+22
Many think that since World War II, a further shift in collective identities has
occurred in Europe, as nationalism has declined significantly among West Euro-
pean publics+23 According to some authors, this decline is part of a general trend
toward the endorsement of postmaterialist values+24 Many observers of European
affairs hold that European integration “has been accompanied by a weakening of
exclusive nationalism and by what might be described as multiple identity, that is,
the coexistence of identities to local, regional, and supranational territorial com-
munities, alongside an identity with the nation+”25
Asserting that a common European identity is progressively developing in West-
ern Europe is not incompatible with the recognition of substantial differences among
countries in this dimension+ European identity formation can be promoted or hin-
dered by a number of factors, both at the individual and collective level+ The latter
might include a diversity of historical experiences, especially those related to wars,
and geographical features of countries, such as peripheral location or insularity+
These differences can affect the degree to which collective identities are
Europeanized+
Constructivists argue that the attitude of national government vis-à-vis Euro-
pean integration is shaped by the way their populations or their elites relate them-
selves to Europe+ A widespread perception of belonging to a European entity, in
addition to—or even as a substitute for—national belonging, is considered a ma-
jor determinant of government policies on supranational integration+26 A strong
degree of European identity promotes the perception that authority is “shared”
with other Europeans rather than “lost” to foreigners, and thus facilitates the trans-
fer of competencies to the supranational level+
Generally speaking, collective identities might affect government policies to-
ward European treaty reform through two types of causal mechanism+ In the first,
members of the political elite make choices on European political integration on
the basis of their identities+ In the second, members of the general public form
21+ See Hall 1999; Reus-Smith 1999; Cronin 1999; and Philpott 2001+ According to Reus-Smith,
“@c#ulturally and historically contingent beliefs about what constitutes a ‘civilized’ state, and how such
states ought to solve cooperation problems, exert a far greater influence on basic institutional practices
than do material structural conditions, the strategic imperatives of particular cooperation problems, or
the stabilization of territorial property rights+” Reus-Smith 1997, 583+
22+ Hall 1999+
23+ Dogan 1994+
24+ Inglehart 1990, 408–14+
25+ Hooghe and Marks 2001, 43+
26+ See Larsen 1997; Marcussen et al+ 1999; Banchoff 1999; Risse 2001; and Hansen and Wæver
2002+
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preferences on European political integration on the basis of their identities, and
political elites engaged in political competition adjust their stance toward the EU
to what they perceive are the preferences of their potential voters+ In the first case,
identities influence policy directly; in the second case, their influence on policy is
mediated by instrumental interests+ In reality, it is plausible to assume that the two
causal mechanisms tend to operate simultaneously, generating various patterns of
interaction+ As Thomas Risse notes, “@p#olitical elites ~including party elites! try
to promote ideas ~including identity constructions! with an eye on gaining power
or remaining in government+”27 Political elites are constrained by public opinion,
but the latter is malleable to the discourses propagated by the former, as research
on public and elite support for European integration has shown+28
The hypothesis deriving from the constructivist emphasis on collective identi-
ties is the following:
H3: Governments of countries with strong [mass/elite] identification with “Europe”
will be more supportive of supranational integration in foreign and security pol-
icy than governments of countries with less European identification+
The text in brackets indicates that two versions of the hypothesis should be tested:
one concerning the general public and the other concerning elite identities+
The balance between national and European identity may not be the only com-
ponent of political culture that affects the willingness to create supranational po-
litical structures+ Ideas about how the exercise of public authority is best organized
might also exert an influence+ Some scholars believe that “where states have an
opportunity, they will seek to create international rules and institutions that are
consistent with domestic principles of political order+”29 For instance, Daniel Deud-
ney has hypothesized that, when polities with multiple centers of authority—or
“Philadelphian systems”—cannot avoid interacting with other polities, they find a
policy of “binding”—that is, a reciprocal limitation of autonomy by means of in-
stitutional links—more “congenial” than balance-of-power practices+30 Similarly,
Anne-Marie Burley has argued that post–World War II multilateral institutions are
projections of the U+S+ New Deal regulatory state+31 Some proponents of the “dem-
ocratic peace” thesis argue that democratic states tend to “export” the principle of
peaceful conflict resolution when dealing with each other+32
In the context of the EU, it has been noted that adaptation to supranational in-
tegration is easier for some countries than for others+ In particular, the institu-
tional structures of the EU strongly resemble those of the Federal Republic of
27+ Risse 2001, 202–3+
28+ Wessels 1995+
29+ Ikenberry 1998, 163+
30+ Deudney 1996, 213–16+
31+ Burley 1993+
32+ Maoz and Russett 1993+
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Germany, ensuring a high degree of “congruence” between the two constitutional
orders+33 It can plausibly be argued that this “strikingly good fit”34 makes Euro-
pean political integration more welcome to the German political and administra-
tive elites than to other Europeans, such as the British, whose domestic state
structures are considerably different from the EU+ Wolfgang Wagner has shown
that, during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, the governments of coun-
tries with entrenched parliamentary representation at the regional level wanted a
stronger European Parliament, whereas the countries with no regional parliaments
were opposed+35
Based on these considerations, the fourth causal factor examined in this article
is the constitutional culture that prevails in a country, and specifically the legiti-
macy and practice of multilayered governance in the domestic context+ Two typi-
cal constitutional cultures can be envisaged from this perspective+ One conceives
sovereignty as a unitary and indivisible attribute of a polity+ With reference to
France, Stanley Hoffmann has pointed to “the tendency to look at sovereignty not
as a bundle of discrete powers and separable state functions, but rather as a talis-
man, indivisible and inalienable yet eminently losable+”36 Similarly, J+ C+ D+ Clark
notes that “the United Kingdom’s dynastic unification, crucially combined with
the union of Church and State at the Reformation, endowed her with a unitary,
absolutist doctrine of sovereignty, + + + within which the concept of ‘sharing sover-
eignty’ became a contradiction in terms+”37 This idea of a “supreme, irresistible,
absolute, uncontrolled authority, in which + + + the rights of sovereignty, reside” ~as
Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries formulated it! is still at the basis of the
British legal system+38 This conception is generally hostile to the vertical division
of powers, which is seen as a threat to the integrity of public authority+ According
to a different type of constitutional culture, public power can be, and should be,
distributed among multiple territorial levels, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity or comparative efficiency+ In the first type, the exercise of sovereign
power is concentrated and “monocentric;” in the second type it is diffuse and
“pluricentric+”
The fourth hypothesis considered in this article is thus:
H4: Governments of countries where a monocentric conception of political author-
ity prevails will find it more difficult to accept a supranational transfer of powers
in the CFSP than governments of countries where the pluricentric constitutional
culture is stronger+
33+ See Bulmer 1997; Schmidt 1999; and Buller and Jeffery 2000+
34+ Bulmer 1997, 76+
35+ Wagner 2002+
36+ Hoffmann 1995, 254+
37+ Clark 1991, 60+
38+ Quoted by Goldsworthy 1999, 10+ On the central role of the sovereignty of Parliament in En-
glish political culture and its implications for European integration, see Clark 1991 and Larsen 1997+
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In other words, a constitutional culture that emphasizes multilayered governance
within the boundaries of the state predisposes its leaders to accept and promote
the creation of an additional layer of governance, if this seems to increase policy
effectiveness+ This predisposition facilitates institutional isomorphism+ The idea
of indivisible sovereignty, on the contrary, creates a conceptual obstacle to supra-
national political integration+
It is important to note that the analyses below are not based on measures of
“culture,” but on an index measuring domestic institutional structures+ In a later
section, I will argue that this index is suitable for assessing the hypothesis formu-
lated above+ The validity of my conclusions about the impact of constitutional
culture will depend crucially on the plausibility of that argument+
In this section I have identified four factors that might plausibly explain the
variance in government support for a supranational foreign and security policy+
Each of these factors is stressed by a different “school” in international relations
theory, but this does not exclude the idea that they can complement each other in
explaining governmental preferences concerning political integration+
Most importantly, each causal factor is formulated in such a general way that,
taken together, they encompass a large number of more specific explanations ad-
vanced in the literature+ For instance, national characteristics such as neutral sta-
tus and a “special relationship” with the United States can be subsumed under
preferences over policies; and factors such as the consequences of a peripheral or
insular location, of historical experiences and memories, and socialization effects
deriving from EU membership can be subsumed under the question of European
identity+ An explanatory framework that focuses on the four variables discussed
above can hope to grasp many of the relevant differences between the member-
states+ Even so, the expectation is that the variables considered can explain a sub-
stantial part of the variance—not the total variance+
Explanatory Strategies
The previous section has identified a number of possible influences on the willing-
ness of European governments to establish a supranational foreign and security
policy+ The hypotheses, however, have been formulated in such a general way as
to leave unspecified the character of the causal links+ Before the hypotheses can
be tested empirically, this character must be made explicit+ This article considers
two possible interpretations of the causal link concept+ According to the first in-
terpretation, the causal factor increases the probability of the outcome ~net of the
effect of other relevant causes!+ According to the second interpretation, the cause
~by itself or in combination with other causes! represents a necessary and0or suf-
ficient condition for the outcome to occur+ The first understanding underpins most
quantitative research+ The second understanding underpins, sometimes implicitly,
many qualitative comparative, “small-N” investigations+39
39+ See Ragin 2000, 313; and Mahoney 2000+
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In this article I posit that both approaches are legitimate for the study of the
problem at hand+40 Therefore, in the following I will ask two related questions
with regard to the four explanatory variables considered above: ~1! Do these vari-
ables affect the probability that a government is supportive of a supranational re-
form of the CFSP, ceteris paribus? and ~2! Are any of these causal conditions
necessary and0or sufficient for supranationalism, by themselves or in combination
with other causal conditions?
This article aims to answer the first question using multivariate logistic regres-
sion+ Correlational methods, however, might not be equally suited for answering
questions of the second kind, which are expressed in logical terms+ Sufficiency
and necessity can be conceptualized as set-theoretic relationships, and for this rea-
son I will examine the second research question using a novel method that has
been developed by Charles Ragin and is based on fuzzy-set logic+41 Both explan-
atory strategies involve a comparison between the member-states of the EU, al-
though the logic of comparison is different+42 Moreover, both types of cross-
national comparative investigation are intended as a complement to, not as a
substitute for, detailed case studies at the country level+43
Logistic regression is used frequently in the analysis of social and political data
and does not require an introduction+ Ragin’s fuzzy-set method is less well known,
and thus a brief description is appropriate+ The method is a formal tool for quali-
tative comparisons that builds on a previous technique, Qualitative Comparative
Analysis ~QCA!,44 which is based on Boolean algebra and has been applied to
various topics in political research, including international alliances, coercive di-
plomacy, revolutionary movements, the breakdown of democratic regimes, and the
development of welfare states+45 Similar to its predecessor, fuzzy-set analysis is
specifically designed to deal with situations in which the number of cases is mod-
erate ~between about 5 and 50! and causality is multiple ~different causes can gen-
erate the same outcome! and conjunctural ~the impact of a factor on the outcome
depends on its interaction with other factors—that is, what matters are combina-
tions of causes!+
Compared to QCA, the main strength of fuzzy-set analysis is that it is not re-
stricted to situations in which the outcome and the causes are either present or
absent; it can also be applied to observations displaying more or less of a certain
40+ Mahoney 2001, 589 notes that it is “an open question whether relationships based on the logic
of necessary and sufficient conditions or relationships derived from linear correlations will be found
more frequently by researchers+”
41+ Ragin 2000+
42+ Another study that combines logistic regression analysis with Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative
Analysis ~the precursor of his fuzzy-set method! is Kiser et al+ 1995+
43+ The following collections include case studies on single countries: Hill 1996; Howorth and Me-
non 1997; and Manners and Whitman 2000+ The most satisfactory answer to the research questions of
the present article is likely to emerge from the dialogue between country-level case studies and the
kind of comparative investigation conducted here+
44+ See Ragin 1987; and Ragin et al+ 1996+
45+ See, for instance,Amenta and Poulsen 1996; Berg-Schlosser and De Meur 1994; Chernoff 1995;
Goodwin 2001; Harvey 1999; and Wickham-Crowley 1992+
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property+ This is because fuzzy sets embody both qualitative states ~full member-
ship and full nonmembership in a set! and variation by level ~degrees of member-
ship between 0 and 1!+ In addition, fuzzy-set analysis can incorporate a probabilistic
interpretation of causality and take into account statistical significance+46
Compared to quantitative methods, fuzzy-set analysis is designed for the dis-
covery of patterns of causal necessity and sufficiency in intermediate-sized N’s+ It
is very sensitive to causal complexity, that is, multiple and conjunctural causation+
The use of interaction terms is subject to stringent limitations in most quantitative
methods, whereas fuzzy-set analysis starts by examining all possible combina-
tions of causal conditions ~saturated interaction! and then simplifies the model in
a top-down manner+47
In a nutshell, researchers using fuzzy-set QCA do the following+ First, they use
substantive and theoretical knowledge to assign fuzzy-set membership scores to
cases in both the outcome and the causal conditions in which they are interested+
Second, they look for causal conditions with membership scores that are consis-
tently greater than outcome membership scores+ If there is a causal condition in
which this happens in all cases, then this condition passes the test of necessity+
Third, to examine sufficiency they compare the membership scores of the out-
come with the score of all logically possible combinations of the causal condi-
tions, and they look for combinations with membership scores that are consistently
lower than outcome membership scores+ If there is a combination for which this
happens in all cases, then this condition passes the test of sufficiency+ Researchers
eliminate those expressions that pass the test of sufficiency but are logically re-
dundant and obtain a logically parsimonious statement of causal sufficiency+ This
statement is then evaluated in terms of any simplifying assumption that it incor-
porates ~simplifying assumptions are statements about the hypothetical outcome
of combinations of causal conditions that do not occur in the population studied!+48
Operationalization and Data
In this article, logistic regression and the fuzzy-set method are used to analyze
evidence collected from all the states that were EU members in 1996+ This re-
quires an operationalization of the causal factors that is sufficiently precise to al-
46+ Probabilistic techniques for statistical significance testing in fuzzy-set QCA require a popula-
tion with a relatively large number of cases+ Since the population considered in this article includes
only thirteen countries, I conduct what Ragin calls a “veristic” test of necessity and sufficiency+ In a
veristic test, one single disconfirming case is considered enough to reject the hypothesis of sufficiency
and necessity+ This criterion is common in small-N comparative studies+ Mahoney 2000+ It seems ad-
equate in the context of the present study because its deterministic character is balanced by the prob-
abilistic character of logistic regression analysis+
47+ Ragin 2000, 72+
48+ A paper describing the various steps in more detail is available at ^http:00personal+lse+ac+uk0
koenigar0fuzzy+htm&+ Accessed 8 September 2003+ For a full exposition, see Ragin 2000+
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low comparisons between fifteen countries and that takes into account the difficulty
of collecting in-depth homogeneous data for such a range of countries+
The first task is to operationalize the outcome variable, that is, the preferences
of governments concerning the degree of supranationalism in their foreign and
security policy cooperation+ In most areas of political research, to identify the pref-
erences of actors is more difficult than to ascertain their behavior, which is gener-
ally visible+ To determine the preference ordering of collective actors such as
national governments is even more difficult, given their composite nature and the
possibility of internal disagreements and even conflicts+ In this article, the prob-
lem of determining preferences is solved by relying on the public statements that
the governments themselves issued to illustrate the position they intended to pro-
mote at the Intergovernmental Conferences for the institutional reform of the EU+
The audiences for these statements were their parliaments and publics, as well as
the governments of other member-states+ The prenegotiation phase of the IGC held
in 1996–97 seems a useful context to elicit these positions, as all fifteen govern-
ments prepared and publicized papers outlining their stance on a broad range of
issues expected to be on the negotiating table+49 As noted above, the position of
each member-state on the most important treaty revisions concerning CFSP is sum-
marized in Table 1+ The explanation of how the information contained in that table
provides the input ~outcome variable! for the analyses is given in the next section,
as the two methods employed differ in this respect+
The assessment of the first explanatory variable, “policy conformity,” requires
a way to identify governments that tend to be preference outliers with respect to
various international problems+ Here I use voting behavior in the UN General As-
sembly as a proxy, because UN delegations vote on a number of issues of world
politics that might be the topic of CFSP decisions+ In fact, about 95 percent of
roll-call votes in the period 1991–96 fell into four categories: disarmament, colo-
nialism, the Middle East, and human and political rights ~including the conflict in
former Yugoslavia!+50 These issue areas either already belong to the CFSP’s re-
mit,51 or governments can reasonably expect them to be added to the EU’s com-
petencies in the future+52 I considered the five sessions held between the end of
the Cold War and the start of the IGC of 1996–97 ~Sessions 45th to 50th!+ During
this period, the General Assembly adopted 434 resolutions by recorded or roll-call
vote, and in 176 cases the vote of EU member countries53 was not unanimous+ For
49+ These documents are listed in the Appendix+ They are treated here not as indicators of the op-
timal level of integration preferred by each government in absolute terms, but as indications of their
relative location on the continuum from national sovereignty to supranational governance+
50+ Voeten 2000, 209+
51+ Conseil de l’Union Européenne, 2003+
52+ Voting behavior in the UN Assembly is an imperfect indicator of the “true” preferences of gov-
ernments, because there are several incentives for misrepresentation+ However, this indicator seems a
useful way to determine how often the position of each government differs from the position of most
other EU governments, and thus its relative tendency to be a preference outlier+
53+ 1996 membership status+
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each of these 176 “contentious” resolutions, I determined how each EU member-
state voted ~three possibilities: “yes,” “no,” or abstention! and how many other
member-states voted in the same way ~“partners” henceforth!+54 Since in 1996 there
were fifteen EU members, this number can range from a minimum of zero ~the state
is isolated! to a maximum of thirteen ~the state is part of a majority of fourteen
against one dissenter!+55 Each country is given a conformity score, which equals
the average number of partners it had in the 176 resolutions+ A low average is an
indication that the state is a preference outlier, while a high average indicates that
its policy preferences generally coincide with those of a majority of EU member-
states+
The average number of partners, or “likeminded” states, determines the likeli-
hood that a government would have its preferences overrun in hypothetical votes
in the EU+ This proxy certainly has several limitations+ For instance, it can cap-
ture the risk, but not the cost, of being outvoted, because the latter depends on the
relative importance of the issues for the governments+ However, short of an in-
depth analysis of the foreign policy preferences of each EU government, this ap-
proach would seem the best way to systematically compare the disadvantage of
supranationalism that each state has to bear because of disagreements about the
best way to respond to international problems+ This proxy, for instance, would
indicate that a country such as Italy ~average number of partners: 9+9! can be al-
most certain to be part of either a majority or a blocking minority, while the United
Kingdom ~5+3! would be much more uncertain about its ability to thwart un-
desired decisions in case of a vote+
To measure the second causal factor—power capabilities—I rely on the Com-
posite Index of Material Capabilities ~CIMC! developed by the Correlates of War
~COW! Project, which is probably the most commonly used power index in the
international relations literature+ The CIMC results from two demographic indica-
tors ~total population and urban population!, two industrial indicators ~energy con-
sumption and steel production!, and two military indicators ~military expenditures
and armed forces size!+ For each of these indicators, the COW research team cal-
culates the total score ~in people, tons, dollars, etc+! for the international system in
a given year, ascertains the percentage share held by each state, and calculates the
average of these percentage shares+56 In this article, however, I consider each state’s
share of the EU total, because I am interested in the differences in power among
member-states only+ The CIMC used here is for 1992, the last year for which
data on EU countries are currently available in the National Material Capabilities
Data set+57
54+ Data from UN ~various years!+
55+ The maximum number of partners a government can have in a vote is thirteen because I do not
consider the resolutions voted unanimously by all fifteen EU member-states+
56+ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972+
57+ Singer and Small 199001999+
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In comparison to other possible indicators of national power capabilities, the
CIMC has the advantage of expressing economic power as well as military power,
and potential military power ~expressed by the economic indicators! as well as
actual power+ The inclusion of the economic dimension is useful because eco-
nomic coercion and incentives are important tools of foreign and security policy
even when the possibility of using military force remains essential+ Considering
potential military power is important to do justice to the neorealist position ac-
cording to which structural factors ultimately govern international politics: in this
logic, potential capabilities are crucial because states will sooner or later trans-
form them into actual military capabilities as a result of the competitive nature of
the international environment ~a state that fails to do so is a clear anomaly from
the point of view of neorealism!+58 However, the results reported in the next sec-
tion are robust alternative measurements of national capabilities+59
Concerning my third causal factor, the study of national and supranational iden-
tity is occasionally conducted by means of discourse analysis+60 However, the state
of the art in EU studies does not yet allow the use of this sophisticated tool to
compare all EU member-states+ Another common way to operationalize European
identity is to rely on the results of opinion polls+ The standard source on public
attitudes toward European integration is the Eurobarometer survey, which is con-
ducted periodically in all member-states on behalf of the European Commission+
The survey question that will be used in this article is the following: “In the near
future do you see yourself as + + + ?” where five answers are possible: ~1! Austrian0
Belgian0Danish0etc+ only, ~2! Austrian0Belgian0Danish0etc+ and European, ~3!
European and Austrian0Belgian0Danish0etc+, ~4! European only, and ~5! don’t
know+ For each country, I construct a “European identity score,” which equals the
sum of the percentages of all respondents indicating “European” as ~part of ! their
identity minus the percentage of respondents indicating “@nationality# only+” I pooled
the data from four different Eurobarometer surveys, which were conducted be-
tween March 1992 and December 1995+61
58+ Waltz 1993, 66– 67+
59+ The results reported in the following sections are not affected substantially if the gross domes-
tic product ~GDP! or total population are used as indicators of material capability instead of the CIMC+
Regarding military indicators, the number of personnel committed for the new European Rapid Reac-
tion Force at the Capabilities Pledging Conference ~November 2000! could be considered an approx-
imation of the military capabilities that each state could deploy abroad in the medium term+ National
shares correlate almost perfectly with each state’s CIMC ~Spearman’s rho 5 0+94!+ Data from NATO
2001+
60+ See Larsen 1997; Marcussen et al+ 1999; and Hansen and Wæver 2002+
61+ The Eurobarometer surveys used are: No+ 37 ~fieldwork: March–April 1992!, No+ 40 ~field-
work: October–November 1993!, No+ 43+1 ~fieldwork: April–May 1995!, and No+ 44+1 ~fieldwork:
November–December 1995!+ See Reif and Melich 1995, 1997; and Reif and Marlier 1998a, 1998b+
These surveys were selected because they include all the questions relevant for the hypothesis+ Fig-
ures for Austria and Sweden are taken from surveys No+ 43+1 and 44+1 only; figures for Finland are
taken from No+ 40, 43+1, and 44+1+
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Two different European identity scores were computed: one for all respondents
and one for the respondents that scored highest on the “opinion leadership index”
developed by the Eurobarometer investigators+62 Opinion leaders are a broader cat-
egory than political elites, but their responses can be considered fairly good ap-
proximations of elite positions, as they are “the political stratum closest to the
political elites+”63
A comparison of the scores of the general public and the scores of the opinion
leaders reveals three things: ~1! In every country, the European identity score of
opinion leaders is positive ~that is, the number of respondents feeling European is
larger than the number of “nationals only”!, while in five out of fifteen countries
the score of the general population is negative ~that is, the respondents not feeling
European outnumber those who do!+ ~2! In every country, the opinion leaders score
higher than the general population ~the average difference is 23 points, with a
minimum of 11+1 and a maximum of 33+8!+ This pattern clearly matches the re-
sults of a number of studies on public support for European integration+64 ~3! Cross-
nationally, the opinion leaders’ scores and the mass scores are almost perfectly
correlated ~Spearman’s rho 5 +97!+ In other words, high levels of opinion leaders’
identification with Europe correspond to high levels of mass identification, and
vice versa+ Because of this high correlation, two different models have been esti-
mated in the next section: one with the scores of opinion leaders and the other
with the scores of the general public+
In order to assess the fourth causal factor, it is necessary to estimate whether
the constitutional culture of a country is closer to the monocentric or to the pluri-
centric ideal type+ The actual institutional structure of the polity can be considered
a proxy of that culture, as it is plausible to assume a broad correspondence be-
tween the predominant views on the legitimate distribution of public authority and
the rules concerning regional governance in each country+ Liesbet Hooghe and
Gary Marks have developed a twelve-point index of regional governance in EU
countries, based on the degree of constitutional federalism, the presence of special
territorial autonomy, the role of regions in central government, and the existence
of regional elections+65 In the following analysis, I use the scores they assign to
each EU member-state for 2000, with one modification: one of their dimensions,
special territorial autonomy, is left out because it is often seen as an exceptional
solution to a specific political problem rather than the institutional consequence of
a distinctive way to conceive political authority+ Later in this article, I elaborate
on why constitutional culture is the most plausible causal mechanism linking sub-
62+ On the construction of the opinion leadership index, see Reif and Marlier 1998c, 1089, or other
versions of the Eurobarometer codebook+ In the four surveys used, 7,249 respondents out of a total of
58,443 ~12+4 percent! received the highest score on that index+
63+ Wessels 1995, 145+
64+ Notably Inglehart 1977+
65+ Hooghe and Marks 2001, 191–212+
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national regional governance and supranational orientation in the case of CFSP
reform+
This completes the description of the data that will be used in measuring the
five variables involved in the following analyses+ For the logistic regression analy-
sis, no further manipulation of the data is necessary: they will be used as input as
they appear in the original data sets+66 The fuzzy-set analysis, however, requires
the transformation of the raw data into fuzzy-set membership scores+
In the following fuzzy-set analysis, the relevant population consists of thirteen
member-states of the EU that participated in the IGC of 1996–97+ Ireland and
Sweden have not been included because of too little information about their posi-
tions+ On the basis of the data presented above, I have assigned to each EU member-
state a fuzzy-set score in the outcome and in the four causal conditions+ These
scores are listed in Table 2+ With regard to the outcome, the governments that
supported all treaty revisions listed in Table 1 are considered fully in the “set of
supranationalist governments” and consequently are assigned a fuzzy-set score
66+ The data set is available at ^http:00personal+lse+ac+uk0koenigar0data+htm&+ Accessed 8 Septem-
ber 2003+ Policy conformity ranges from 5+30 to 9+97 ~mean: 8+70!; material capabilities ranges from
0+00 to 22+00 ~mean: 6+94!; European identity of the general public ranges from 223+00 to 49+10 ~mean:
13+69!; European identity of opinion leaders ranges from 10+80 to 66+20 ~mean: 36+30!; and regional
governance ranges from 0+00 to 10+00 ~mean: 3+41!+ The highest correlation coefficient among the
independent variables ~apart from the two identity scores! is 0+53+ Other statistics confirm that the
analysis below is not affected by multicolinearity problems ~the variance inflation factor values are all
well below 10, the average variance inflation factor is close to 1 and the tolerance statistics are all
above 0+40!+
TABLE 2. Fuzzy-set membership scores of EU member-states
Supranationalist
government
Europeanized
identities
(general
public)
Europeanized
identities
(opinion
leaders)
High
policy
conformity
Strong
regional
governance
High
material
capabilities
Austria 0+92 0+18 0+00 0+70 0+80 0+09
Belgium 1+00 0+63 0+69 0+97 0+80 0+14
Denmark 0+25 0+21 0+05 0+96 0+00 0+05
Finland 0+25 0+19 0+12 0+80 0+00 0+09
France 0+33 0+84 0+93 0+26 0+40 0+68
Germany 0+92 0+47 0+37 0+88 1+00 1+00
Greece 0+75 0+36 0+21 0+49 0+10 0+14
Italy 0+92 0+95 1+00 0+99 0+60 0+64
Luxemburg 0+92 1+00 0+98 1+00 0+00 0+00
Netherlands 1+00 0+53 0+54 0+94 0+30 0+18
Portugal 0+67 0+42 0+19 0+98 0+10 0+05
Spain 0+83 0+55 0+28 0+59 0+60 0+41
UK 0+00 0+00 0+01 0+00 0+10 0+86
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of 1+ The governments that rejected all treaty changes are considered to be fully
out of the set of supranationalist governments and receive a fuzzy-set score of 0+
The other governments are assigned intermediate scores exactly in proportion to
the number of treaty changes they supported or opposed+
With regard to the causal conditions, I have assigned fuzzy-set scores to coun-
tries according to a standardized criterion: the country with the lowest value on
each variable ~as recorded in the data sources presented earlier in this section! is
assigned a fuzzy-set membership score of 0, the country with the highest value is
assigned a fuzzy-set score of 1, and all other countries receive intermediate scores+67
Two comments on this procedure are necessary+
The first concerns the decision to retain all the variation to be found in the raw
data+ According to Ragin, one of the advantages of fuzzy sets over conventional
ratio or interval scale measures is the possibility of eliminating variation in the
data that is not meaningful from the point of view of the research question+ For
instance, if a researcher is interested in how democratic states conduct wars and
has identified a threshold beyond which states can be considered fully democratic,
then it can be advisable to ignore any further variation in levels of democracy
beyond that threshold+
In the case of the four causal conditions examined here, however, no variation
can be declared clearly irrelevant on the basis of prior information at the case
level or theoretical considerations+ In such situations, any truncation of the origi-
nal data runs the risk of being arbitrary and controversial+ The safest option is to
retain all naturally occurring variation and invite readers to replicate the analysis
with different fuzzy-set scores if they believe that more appropriate breakpoints
can be identified+
The second comment concerns the countries that are classified as fully in or
fully out of the set of countries with a relevant characteristic+ I maintain that the
countries that are assigned a score of 1 or 0 because they display the maximum or
minimum value on the four variables correspond to the countries that can be con-
67+ More specifically: ~1! the country with the most “conformist” preferences in the UN General
Assembly receives a fuzzy-set score of 1, while the country that is more often a preference outlier has
a score of 0; ~2! the country with the highest material capabilities has a score of 1, while the weakest
country has a score of 0; ~3! the country with the most developed layer of regional governance is
assigned a fuzzy-set score of 1, while the most centralized one has a score of 0; ~4! the country with
the highest proportion of people feeling European in the Eurobarometer survey is assigned a fuzzy-set
membership score of 1, while the country with the lowest proportion receives a score of 0; and finally
~5! the country with the highest proportion of opinion leaders feeling European in the Eurobarometer
survey is assigned a fuzzy-set membership score of 1, while the country with the lowest proportion
receives a score of 0+ Scores are normalized to unit interval by applying the following equation:
mi 5
vi 2 min~v!
max~v! 2 min~v!
where mi is the fuzzy-set membership score of the ith country, vi is the original value of the variable
for the ith country, and the max~v! and min~v! are the maximum and minimum values respectively+
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sidered fully in or fully out of each set on the basis of other substantive and theo-
retical knowledge+ Because space constraints prevent a detailed discussion of those
countries, the following offers a quick overview+ Germany has been described by
structural realists as the potentially dominant power in Europe68 and can be con-
sidered to be fully in the “set of European countries with high material capabili-
ties+” Conversely, Luxemburg can be seen as fully out of that set+ On the other
hand, Luxemburg and Italy can be seen as fully in ~or virtually fully in! the “set of
countries with Europeanized identities,”69 while Britain can be considered fully
out because “the prevailing English identity still perceives Europe as the ~friendly!
‘other+’”70 Germany is fully in the “set of countries with strong regional gover-
nance,” while a number of member-states do not display any federal features+71
Finally, Luxemburg can be seen as fully in the “set of policy-conformist coun-
tries,” because it lacks virtually all characteristics that could set it apart from most
of its European partners: it has no “special relationship” with a non-EU power, no
links to former colonies, no special geopolitical interests in other regions, and no
military personnel permanently stationed abroad+ The United Kingdom has oppo-
site characteristics ~notably a strong tendency to support U+S+ policies! and, con-
sequently, many opportunities for dissenting from its EU partners: for this reason
it can be considered fully out of the set of conformist countries+ In sum, I contend
that the membership scores obtained through the standardized procedure described
above, including those of full membership and full nonmembership, are corrobo-
rated by additional substantive and theoretical knowledge+ Overall, the following
analysis reflects the best estimate of membership scores by the present author+
Logistic Regression Analysis
The units of observation of the regression analysis are the governments’ decisions
to support or oppose specific treaty changes that were on the agenda of the 1996–97
IGC+ As indicated above, six possible changes were particularly relevant for the
creation of a supranational CFSP+ The outcome variable is dichotomous ~support
of or opposition to the treaty change! and the number of observations is seventy+72
The four hypotheses articulated earlier in this article can be reformulated with
greater precision: the probability that a specific treaty change is supported by a
government increases when ~1! the policy conformity of the government is higher,
~2! its level of material capabilities is lower, ~3! European identification is stron-
ger, and ~4! domestic regional governance is stronger+ These hypotheses are tested
68+ Waltz 1993+
69+ Koenig-Archibugi 2003+
70+ Risse 2001, 199+
71+ Hooghe and Marks 2001, 191–212+
72+ This is less than ninety ~six revisions multiplied by fifteen governments!, because the position
of certain governments on particular issues could not be ascertained+
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by estimating logistic models with robust standard errors and clustering by coun-
try+73 Given the non-independence of same-country observations, the analysis is
best seen as exploratory rather than definitive+ Table 3 presents the results of the
models+
Overall, the models perform well, predicting about 93 percent of all cases cor-
rectly, which is an 80 percent reduction in error from the null model that predicts
about 64 percent correctly+ The explanatory variables account for about 68 per-
cent of the variation in outcome+ Considering the individual variables, all have a
statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a government will support a
supranationalist treaty change, with the exception of policy conformity+ That im-
pact is in the expected direction+
To facilitate the interpretation of logit coefficients, I use statistical simulation to
convert them into probabilities and confidence intervals, which provide a more
73+ The models were estimated in STATA using a Huber0White0sandwich estimator to calculate
robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering by country+ StataCorp 2001+ Clustering allows
the relaxation of the assumption that decisions taken by the same government are independent+ I con-
tinue to assume that observations are independent across countries+
TABLE 3. Logistic regression of government support for supranational
CFSP, 1996
Model 1 Model 2
policy conformity 2+532 2+566
~+307! ~+318!
material capabilities 21+086*** 21+231***
~+197! ~+206!
european identity of the general public +072**
~+021!
european identity of opinion leaders +086***
~+028!
regional governance 2+780*** 3+081***
~+501! ~+517!
Constant 4+759 3+271
~2+837! ~2+963!
Number of observations 70 70
Log likelihood 214+6454 214+4633
Pseudo R2 0+6790 0+6830
Wald x2 38+27*** 46+67***
Correctly classified 92+9% 92+9%
Note: The figures in each cell give the logistic regression estimate with robust standard errors corrected for clustering
at the country level in parentheses+
***p , +001, **p , +01, *p , +05+
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intuitive illustration of the relationship between the variables+74 Table 4 reports
these probabilities and confidence intervals for three explanatory variables ~policy
conformity is not included as it did not reach statistical significance in the mod-
els!+ To save space, only the results for model 1 are reported, as the results of
model 2 are similar+ The values in the second column of Table 4 express the av-
erage probability that a particular treaty change is supported when one explana-
tory variable is set at its maximum or minimum in the sample, while all other
explanatory variables are fixed at their mean+ The values in the third column indi-
cate the range in which 95 percent of the predicted values generated by the simu-
lation fell+75 The quantities in Table 4 represent counterfactual statements, indicating
which probability of support could be expected in hypothetical cases that display
certain values of the explanatory variables ~that is, one variable at the maximum
or minimum value and all others at their means!+
Table 4 shows that, all else being equal, as material capabilities decrease from
the maximum value found in the data ~that of Germany! to the minimum value
~that of Luxemburg!, the probability of support rises from 0 to almost 1+ In other
words, the absence of support is certain when capabilities are at their highest, and
the presence of support is virtually certain when they are at their lowest+ Ex-
tremely narrow confidence intervals confirm that the margin of error is very low+
Similarly, shifting the level of regional governance from its minimum ~that of Ire-
land and other countries! to its maximum ~Germany! increases the probability of
support from almost 0 ~certain absence! to 1 ~certain presence!, ceteris paribus+
74+ I use the technique developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000 and implemented in their
software CLARIFY+ Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001+
75+ The simulation process was repeated 1000 times, thus the lower and upper bounds of the con-
fidence interval correspond to the numbers in the 25th and 976th position respectively+
TABLE 4. Predicted probabilities of support for supranationalism
Variable
Probability that
a treaty change
is supported
(average predicted
value)
95%
confidence
interval
material capabilities Minimum +9999 +9998–1
Maximum 0 0–+0002
regional governance Minimum +0034 +0002–+0157
Maximum 1 1–1
european identity of the general public Minimum +5934 +2090–+9082
Maximum +9939 +9738–+9994
Note: The values represent the predicted probability of support as the specified variable is at its minimum or maxi-
mum value while the other variables are held at their mean+
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Again, extremely narrow confidence intervals indicate that error is very unlikely+
Finally, all else being equal, as European identity increases from its minimum value
~corresponding to Sweden! to its maximum value ~Luxemburg!, the probability of
support rises from 0+59 to 0+99+ This effect is smaller than the impact of capabil-
ities and regional governance, but still substantial+ The confidence intervals of the
minimum are large: this means that, while one can be confident about the exis-
tence and direction of the relationship, one is less certain about the precise mag-
nitude of the effect of European identity+
Fuzzy-Set Analysis
This section reports the results of the application of the fuzzy-set method to the
scores in Table 2+76 As in the previous section, two separate analyses are con-
ducted, the first considering the European identity of the general public and the
second considering the European identity of opinion leaders only ~the other pos-
sible causal conditions remain the same!+
The first result is that for none of the four causal conditions, fuzzy membership
scores in the outcome were in all cases less than or equal to fuzzy membership
scores in the causal condition+ This suggests that none of the causal factors exam-
ined is necessary for supranationalism+ This applies regardless of whether opinion
leaders’ identity or mass identity is considered+
The second result is that, after algebraic simplification, the analysis of suffi-
ciency yields the following solution: there is one combination of causes that is
sufficient for supranationalism—the combination of regional governance and pol-
icy conformity+ In fuzzy-set notation, this solution can be expressed as follows:
regionalism • conformity r supranationalism
where the symbol • indicates the logical “and,” and r means “is sufficient for+”
Again, this result applies regardless of whether leaders’ opinion or mass opinion
is considered+
It should be noted that the sufficiency solution just reported can be described as
conservative, because it does not use any “simplifying assumptions+” In QCA, sim-
plifying assumptions are statements about the hypothetical outcome of combina-
tions of causal conditions that do not occur in the population studied+ They are a
reflection of the limited diversity of naturally occurring social phenomena+ On the
basis of substantive knowledge about the object of study, the researcher may as-
sume that a given combination of causal conditions, if it had occurred, would have
76+ As mentioned above, I conducted a “veristic” test, that is, one single disconfirming case is con-
sidered enough to reject the hypothesis of sufficiency and necessity+ The analysis was aided by the
computer program fs0QCA+ Ragin and Drass 2002+
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been sufficient for the outcome+ If such an assumption is included in the analysis,
the result may be different than it would have been otherwise+
Various simplifying assumptions have been considered in the present analysis,
but only one of them seems plausible enough to justify its inclusion in the final
solution: the assumption that the combination of regional governance, low capa-
bilities, strong European identity of the general public, and low policy conformity
is sufficient for supranationalism+77 This assumption seems plausible because the
presence of the first three factors named, which are considered favorable to supra-
nationalism on the basis of both theory and the preceding regression analysis, should
be able to offset the single opposing factor ~low policy conformity!+ If one incor-
porates this assumption into the analysis, two combinations of causes pass the test
of sufficiency:
regionalism • conformity 1 regionalism • identity~mass! •;capabilities
r supranationalism
where the symbol 1 indicates the logical “or” and ; indicates the negation of a
causal condition+ In plain English, this means that either the combination of re-
gional governance and policy conformity, or the combination of regional gover-
nance, European identity of the general public, and low power capabilities is
sufficient for supranationalism+ This indicates that there are two paths to suprana-
tionalism, both involving regional governance+ Regional governance appears to be
sufficient for supranationalism if it is combined either with policy conformity or
with two other facilitating conditions: strong European identity of the general pub-
lic and low material capabilities+ If one looks at the European identity of opinion
leaders rather than that of the general public, only the first causal combination
appears sufficient+
I have shown that the main result of the fuzzy-set analysis is that the combina-
tion of regional governance and policy conformity is sufficient for supranational-
ism+ Figure 1 presents this result in graphical form: for each one of the thirteen
governments examined, it is the case that its membership in the fuzzy set of
77+ The simplifying assumptions that were considered but not accepted are the following: in the
analysis with general public opinion,
identity~mass!• conformity •;regionalism • capabilities,
;identity~mass!• conformity •;regionalism • capabilities,
identity~mass!•;conformity •;regionalism •;capabilities,
and in the analysis with opinion leaders’ identity:
;identity~leaders!• conformity •;decentra • capabilities,
identity~leaders!• conformity •;regionalism • capabilities+
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supranationalist governments ~y-axis! is at least as high as its membership in the
intersection of regional governance and policy conformity ~x-axis!+
Discussion
Regression and fuzzy-set analyses have yielded the following results:
1+ Strong regional governance increases the probability that governments
prefer a supranational foreign and security policy, ceteris paribus, and it
represents a sufficient condition for supranationalism when combined with
policy conformity ~or with low material capabilities and Europeanized
mass identities, under reasonable assumptions!+
2+ Higher material capabilities decrease the probability that governments
prefer a supranational foreign and security policy, ceteris paribus+
          
FIGURE 1. Supranationalism, regional governance, and policy conformity
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3+ More Europeanized identities increase the probability that governments
prefer a supranational foreign and security policy, ceteris paribus, although
the impact seems somewhat smaller than that of regional governance and
material capabilities+
4+ Policy conformity does not significantly affect the probability of suprana-
tionalism, but in combination with strong regional governance it becomes
sufficient to generate supranationalism+
5+ None of the four causal factors is a necessary condition for supranational-
ism+ In other words, governments that support a supranational CFSP are
not necessarily weak, federal, conformist, or Europeanized+ Indeed, among
the most vocal supporters of foreign policy integration, one finds a power-
ful state such as Germany, a government whose citizens declare little Euro-
pean identification such as Austria, a centralized state such as Luxemburg,
and a moderate policy outlier such as Spain+ This negative finding high-
lights an important point: none of the factors examined here represents an
insuperable obstacle to supranationalism—that is, an adverse condition that
cannot be overcome even when other, more favorable, characteristics are
present+
A number of issues deserve closer attention+ The first concerns policy confor-
mity, which has no statistically significant effect on the probability of supranation-
alism according to regression analysis, but is sufficient for supranationalism if it
is found together with a high degree of supranational governance according to
fuzzy-set analysis+ As indicated above, the two analytical strategies have different
explanatory aims and, therefore, the fact that a causal factor is shown to be rele-
vant by one of them and irrelevant by the other is not necessarily a problem+ How-
ever, it is a finding that demands an explanation+ The most plausible interpretation
is the following+ A pluricentric constitutional culture removes an important con-
ceptual obstacle—the idea of national sovereignty as unitary and indivisible—
from the transfer of decisional powers to the European level+ The anticipation that
most decisions made in supranational fora would correspond to the government’s
substantive policy preferences adds to this permissive factor a positive incentive
to support supranationalization, and it is the combination of permissive and posi-
tive conditions that makes this particular conjuncture sufficient for the outcome+
This linkage deserves to be explored in further research, possibly by using in-
depth case studies+78
The second point concerns the impact of regional governance itself+ As indi-
cated above, constitutional culture is measured indirectly, using the actual institu-
tional structure of a country as a proxy+ While the assumption of a correspondence
between ideas and institutions seems reasonable in this case, one should take into
78+ In the logistic regression analysis, the coefficient of the interaction term between regional gov-
ernance and policy conformity is not statistically significant at conventional levels+
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account that domestic structures—and specifically institutions of regional gov-
ernance—can affect national positions on supranational integration in ways that
do not necessarily reflect constitutional ideas and norms+79 In several policy do-
mains, the transfer of policymaking competencies to European institutions can have
the effect of redistributing the political resources that confer influence in the do-
mestic political arena+ Concerning specifically the distribution of power between
regional and central governments, Tanja Börzel has argued that “@f#or regions of
unitary and weakly decentralized states, Europeanization may offer additional op-
portunities which could strengthen their autonomy vis-à-vis the central state, al-
though less resourceful regions often lack the resources to fully exploit these
opportunities+ In highly decentralized states, on the contrary, regions suffer a sig-
nificant loss of their administrative competencies from Europeanization, which re-
sults in an uneven distribution of ‘say and pay’ between the central state and the
regions+”80 The strategic interpretation suggests that the affected political actors
anticipate the potential redistributive effect of Europeanization and develop pref-
erences on further integration accordingly+
This argument, which points to the logic of expected consequences rather than
the logic of appropriateness,81 is useful for explaining the preferences of national
and regional actors in a number of important policy areas+ But in the case of for-
eign and security policy, the link between domestic structures and government
positions on supranationalism is much more likely to be due to cultural factors
than to strategic action+ This is attributable to the character of the policy domain
that is considered here+ The causal mechanism based on strategic calculation can
be expected to operate only when specific institutional interests are at stake+ How-
ever, regional governments normally do not participate in the foreign and security
policymaking of their states+ Therefore, neither they nor the national governments
should expect a change in relative power as a result of Europeanization+ In other
words, the transfer is distributionally neutral, and as such it is unlikely to motivate
strategic moves and countermoves based on institutional self-interest+ On the con-
trary, the explanation based on the logic of appropriateness and constitutional cul-
ture refers to a general attitude toward the vertical division of powers, which is
independent of the specific issues being debated+ Thus the most plausible interpre-
tation of the strong and significant relationship between regional governance and
integrationist preferences shown in the previous section points to the importance
of differences in constitutional culture, as hypothesized in this article+
The third point that needs attention concerns the impact of European identity
and the causal mechanisms that may link it to government support for suprana-
tionalism+ The two possibilities discussed above are: first, that the identities of
political elites affect government policies ~direct causal path!; and second, that
79+ I am grateful to the editors of IO for bringing this important point to my attention+
80+ Börzel 2002, 32–33+
81+ See March and Olsen 1998; and Börzel and Risse 2000+
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mass identities affect government policies through the mediation of instrumental
interests of political leaders ~indirect causal path!+ The analysis conducted above
shows that European identity matters, but is unable to indicate which causal mech-
anism matters most or how they interact+ This is because the measures chosen to
represent mass identities and opinion leaders’ identities are almost perfectly cor-
related ~although in every country, opinion leaders feel considerably more “Euro-
pean” than the general public!+ The clarification of the relative weight of the causal
mechanisms and their interplay is an important topic for research, possibly through
case studies at the country level+82
The final point concerns the possibility of generalizing the findings beyond the
EU+ For instance, it could be argued that federal domestic structures have a posi-
tive influence on the propensity to join international governance structures, all else
being equal+ The ceteris paribus clause must be stressed, as countries such as Swit-
zerland and the United States show that this cannot be an overriding factor+ The
strong national identity of the Swiss and their strong preference for isolationism
in security policy might counteract an integrative impetus stemming from their
federalism+ The United States is a model case of federalism, but it is also a global
hegemonic power and this latter characteristic might be more influential in deter-
mining its attitude toward transfers of sovereignty+ The presence of other, possibly
stronger, factors does not imply, however, that a federalist constitutional culture
has no influence on foreign policy+83
Conclusion
In this article, I have tried to explore systematically the sources of the preferences
of Western European governments concerning the institutional form of their for-
eign and security cooperation+ In contrast to the assumptions of certain theorists
of international politics, I have stressed that the preservation of national sover-
eignty is not a goal shared equally by all governments, because some of them
have shown a willingness to promote strong forms of political integration in Eu-
rope+ The desire to perpetuate the state as an autonomous actor in world politics is
a variable, not a constant+
82+ Such as Marcussen et al+ 1999+
83+ The fact that the United States is less willing to compromise its sovereignty than most of its
Western allies should not overshadow another crucial comparison: as argued by G+ John
Ikenberry, of all powers that won major wars in modern history, the United States has accepted the
strongest constraints on its power through international institutions+ “American power is not only un-
precedented in its preponderance but it is also unprecedented in the way it is manifest with and through
institutions+” See Ikenberry 2001, 258+ A counterfactual thought experiment might ask whether the
same level of self-binding would have been attained had the United States been a country with a cen-
tralistic constitutional culture+ Similarly, a comparison with the foreign policy of Canada, which shares
with the United States various institutional and cultural characteristics but occupies a different rank in
the international distribution of power, might be useful in this context+
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This article has considered a number of possible explanations for the diversity of
preferences, which were drawn from research programs that emphasize instrumen-
tal attitudes toward international institutions and from approaches that stress the logic
of appropriateness in institutional choice+ Regression and fuzzy-set analyses show
that both approaches contribute important insights about the causes of national pref-
erences+ Differences in power resources, stressed by the realist tradition in general
and by the “voice opportunity” thesis in particular, indeed explain part of the dif-
ference: all else being equal, governments of weaker countries are more likely to
support supranational CFSP institutions than governments of stronger countries+
In addition, the constructivist research program provides important insights+ First,
the share of a country’s population that feels “European” affects the position of its
government with regard to constitutional change in EU foreign and security pol-
icy+ The link between collective identity and government policy holds regardless
of whether one looks at the identity of the general public or at that of “opinion
leaders+” Second, and more strikingly, this article has shown that the strength of
regional governance in a country is strongly related to the preference of its gov-
ernment with regard to sovereignty pooling and delegation in foreign affairs+ This
suggests that attitudes toward supranational integration are shaped by distinct con-
ceptions of sovereignty and political authority that prevail in the political culture
of the member-states+ Governments of countries whose domestic constitutions re-
flect and reinforce a positive attitude toward a multilayered distribution of author-
ity tend to support further integration in foreign and security policy more than
countries where sovereignty is considered indivisible+
In contrast to material power capabilities, Europeanized identities, and domes-
tic regional governance, the second factor derived from rationalist approaches—
policy conformity ~that is, the tendency to have preferences on specific policy issues
of world politics that are consistent with the preferences of most other EU member-
states!—has no statistically significant effect on institutional choice, at least as
this variable is measured in this article+ However, even this factor may play a role,
because fuzzy-set analysis reveals that in combination with regional governance,
it constitutes a sufficient condition for supranationalism+
These results lend support to the argument that the relationships among the main
research programs in international relations theory can be complementary as well
as competitive+ While I have compared the explanatory power of hypotheses in-
spired by different theoretical perspectives, I have avoided a “gladiator” style of
analysis, where “one perspective goes forth and slays all others+”84 A substantial
number of scholars of international relations, while identifying themselves primar-
ily with one research tradition, do not expect their theories to fully explain the
phenomena in which they are interested+85 This article has derived specific hypoth-
84+ Checkel 2001, 243+
85+ See, for instance, Grieco 1996, 282; Russett and Oneal 2001, 90; Legro and Moravcsik 1999,
49; and Checkel 2001, 243+
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eses from the core tenets of some influential research programs in international
relations theory, and found that most of them are helpful in explaining the diver-
sity of national positions on sovereignty pooling and delegation+ Hence, this arti-
cle has contributed to moving the study of European political integration further
away from “monocausal mania”86 and toward a more satisfactory multicausal
synthesis+
Appendix: Sources on Government Positions
on CFSP Reform, 1996
Austria:
• Regierungskonferenz 1996: Oesterreichische Grundsatzpositionen, 26
March 1996+
• Leitlinien zu den voraussichtlichen Themen der Regierungskonferenz 1996,
June 1995+
Belgium:
• Note politique du gouvernement au parlement concernant la CIG de 1996,
October 1995+
• Mémorandum de la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg en vue de la
CIG, March 1996+
Denmark:
• Bases of Negotiations: An Open Europe—Intergovernmental Conference
1996, 30 November 1995+
• Agenda for Europe: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Report of the
Danish Foreign Ministry, June 1995+
Finland:
• Memorandum Concerning Finnish Points of View with Regard to the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union, 18 September 1995+
• The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension—Toward an Enhanced
EU Role in Crises Management, memorandum by Finland and Sweden, 24
April 1996+
• Finland’s Points of Departure at the Intergovernmental Conference—Report
to the Parliament, 27 February 1996+
86+ Legro and Moravcsik 1999, 50+
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France:
• Déclaration du Gouvernement sur la préparation et les perspectives de la
Conferénce intergouvernementale, Assemblée Nationale, 13 March 1996+
• Orientations sur la PESC—séminaire franco-allemand des Ministères des
Affaires étrangères à Fribourg, 27 February 1996+
• Confidential Memorandum on France’s Guidelines for the IGC 1996, pub-
lished in Le Figaro, 20 February 1996+
Germany:
• Deutsche Ziele für die Regierungskonferenz, 26 March 1996+
Greece:
• For a Democratic European Union with Political and Social Content—
Greece’s Contribution to the 1996 IGC, 22 March 1996+
Ireland:
• Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: Irish White Paper on Foreign Pol-
icy, 26 March 1996+
Italy:
• Posizione del Governo italiano sulla Conferenza intergovernativa per la
revisione dei Trattati, 18 March 1996+
• Dichiarazione del Governo italiano sulla Conferenza intergovernativa, 23
May 1995+
Luxemburg:
• Aide-mémoire du gouvernement luxembourgeois sur la CIG 96, 30 June
1995+
• Mémorandum de la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg en vue de la
CIG, 7 March 1996+
The Netherlands:
• Between Madrid and Turin: Dutch Priorities on the Eve of the 1996 IGC.
Communication of the Government to the Parliament, March 1996+
• European Foreign Policy, Security and Defence: Toward Stronger External
Action by the European Union, 30 March 1995+
• Mémorandum de la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg en vue de la
Cig, 7 March 1996+
Portugal:
• Portugal e a conferencia intergovernamental para a revisao do tratado da
uniao europeia, March 1996+
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Spain:
• Elementos para una posiciòn española en la Conferencia intergubernamen-
tal de 1996, March 1996+
Sweden:
• Memorandum on the Fundamental Interests of Sweden with a View to the
1996 IGC, 2 March 1995+
• Government Report. The EU Intergovernmental Conference 1996, 30 No-
vember 1995+
• The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension—Toward an Enhanced
EU Role in Crises Management, memorandum by Finland and Sweden, 24
April 1996+
United Kingdom:
• A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the European Union
Intergovernmental Conference 1996, 13 March 1996+
• Memorandum on the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996
IGC, 2 March 1995+
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